Спасибо!
Выделяю для разработчиков новой индикации (в тему разговора про распознание сваливания и действия при оном):
- the AP disconnected while the airplane was flying at the upper limit of a slightly
turbulent cloud layer,
- the copilots had not received any training, at high altitude, in the “Unreliable IAS”
procedure and manual aircraft handling,
- there was an inconsistency between the speeds measured, likely following the
blockage of the Pitot probes in an ice crystal environment,
- although having identified and called out the loss of the speed indications, neither of
the two copilots called the procedure “Unreliable IAS”,
- the invalidity of the speed displayed on the left PFD lasted for 29 seconds, that of the
speed on the ISIS for 54 seconds,
- in less than one minute after the autopilot disconnection, the airplane exited its flight
envelope following inputs that were mainly pitch-up,
- the Captain came back into the cockpit about 1 min 30 after the autopilot
disconnection,
- throughout the flight, the movements of the elevators and the THS were consistent
with the pilot’s inputs,
- up to the exit from the flight envelope, the airplane’s longitudinal movements were
consistent with the position of the flight control surfaces,
- there was no explicit task-sharing between the two copilots,
- there is no CRM training for a crew made up of two copilots in a situation with a relief
Captain,
- no standard callouts were made on the disparities in pitch attitude and vertical speed,
- the airplane’s angle of attack is not directly displayed to the pilots,
- the approach to stall was characterised by the triggering of the warning then the
appearance of buffet,
- neither of the pilots made any reference to the stall warning,
- neither of the pilots formally identified the stall situation,
- the stall warning was triggered continuously for 54 seconds,
- a short time after the triggering of the stall warning, the PF selected TO/GA thrust and
made a nose-up input,
- the angle of attack is the parameter that allows the stall warning to triggered; if the
angle of attack values become invalid, the warning stops,
- by design, when the measured speed values are lower than 60 kt, the 3 angle of
attack values become invalid,
- each time that the stall warning triggered, the angle of attack exceeded the value of
its theoretical trigger threshold,
- the engines functioned normally and always responded to the crew’s inputs,
- no announcement was made to the passengers.
Из рекомендаций:
4.1 Recommendations on Operations
Training for Manual Aircraft Handling
The investigation brought to light weaknesses in the two copilots: the inappropriate inputs by the PF on the flight controls at high altitude were not noted by the PNF through an absence of effective surveillance of the flight path. The stall warning and the buffeting were not identified either. This was probably due to a lack of specific training, although in accordance with regulatory requirements. Manual airplane handling cannot be improvised and requires precision and measured inputs on the flight controls. There are other possible situations leading to autopilot disconnection for which only specific and regular training can provide the skills necessary to ensure the safety of the flight.
Examination of their last training records and check rides made it clear that the copilots had not been trained for manual airplane handling of approach to stall and stall recovery at high altitude.
