Катастрофа самолетов Boeing 737 Max 8 в Индонезии 29.10.2018 и Ethiopian Airlines Аддис-Абеба 10.03.2019 - информация

Регистраторы передали, расшифровка и анализ займет максимум несколько дней.
After an apparent tussle over where the investigation should be held, the flight data and cockpit voice recorders arrived in Paris and were handed over to France’s Bureau of Enquiry and Analysis for Civil Aviation Safety (BEA) agency.

A BEA spokesman said he did not know what condition the black boxes were in. “First we will try to read the data,” he said, adding that the first analyses could take between half a day and several days.
 
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WASHINGTON (March 14, 2019) —The U.S. National Transportation Safety Board is dispatching three investigators to France Thursday to assist with the downloading and analysis of flight recorders from the Boeing 737 MAX 8 that crashed Sunday near Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.

The NTSB investigators have expertise in recorders, flight crew operations and human factors. The French Bureau d'Enquêtes et d'Analyses (BEA) will be downloading the flight data recorder and cockpit voice recorder in support of the Ethiopian investigation.
The investigation is being led by the Ethiopian Aircraft Accident Investigations Bureau in accordance with the standards defined in International Civil Aviation Organization Annex 13. The NTSB appointed an accredited representative to the investigation under the ICAO standards because the airplane was manufactured in the United States. All investigative data regarding the investigation will be released by Ethiopian authorities.

For more information on NTSB participation in foreign investigations go to: Foreign Investigations.

The NTSB investigators dispatched to France will work in coordination with investigators on the ground in Addis Ababa. Those investigators were sent immediately after the accident and have been integral to the efforts underway in Ethiopia. They are being assisted by technical advisers from the Federal Aviation Administration, Boeing and GE/Safran, the manufacturer of the engines.
The NTSB is an independent U.S. federal agency charged with investigating transportation accidents and issuing recommendations to improve safety.
 
ОБОБЩЕНИЕ: Полеты Boeing 737 MAX запрещены в 45 странах после катастрофы в Эфиопии
ОБЩЕСТВО: БОИНГ-ПОЛЕТЫ-ЗАПРЕТ
МОСКВА, 14 марта. /ТАСС/. Россия, США, страны Евросоюза и многие другие государства из соображений безопасности приостановили эксплуатацию Boeing 737 MAX и запретили пролеты этого типа самолетов над своими территориями. Решение было принято после того, как 10 марта в Эфиопии разбился самолет Boeing 737 MAX 8 («Боинг-737 макс-8»), а эксперты сочли, что детали катастрофы схожи с крушением аналогичного самолета в Индонезии в октябре прошлого года.
После массового запрета на полеты Boeing 737 MAX в корпорации Boeing заявили, что понимают причины принятия подобных решений, но при этом выразили уверенность в надежности своих самолетов. По данным источников в авиастроительной отрасли, поставки самолетов Boeing 737 MAX были заморожены, однако производство лайнеров продолжается.
Бортовые самописцы с разбившегося в Эфиопии авиалайнера были доставлены во Францию в Бюро по расследованию и анализу безопасности гражданской авиации (BEA) для изучения.

Массовый запрет

Решения о приостановке эксплуатации самолетов Boeing 737 MAX 8 и их пролеты над своей территорией были приняты более чем в 45 странах мира. Как сообщил журналистам глава Росавиации Александр Нерадько, российское ведомство «через средства авиасвязи разослало уведомление о том, что в воздушном пространстве РФ полеты самолетов этой модификации до особого указания запрещены». Решение о снятии запрета, по его словам, будет основываться на анализе «тех директив и сообщений, которые будут поступать от Федеральной авиационной администрации США, Национального бюро по безопасности на транспорте и самой компании Boeing».
Глава Белого дома Дональд Трамп заявил о том, что США приостанавливают все полеты самолетов Boeing 737 MAX 8 и MAX 9 до его дальнейшего распоряжения.
В Федеральном авиационном управлении (ФАУ) США признали, что катастрофа Boeing в Эфиопии и крушение самолета аналогичной модели в Индонезии в октябре прошлого года похожи. В распоряжении ФАУ о приостановке полетов Boeing 737 MAX американских авиалиний, а также иностранных самолетов этой модели на территории США отмечается, что в результате расследования гибели лайнера в Эфиопии была получена новая информация, свидетельствующая «о некотором сходстве инцидентов с рейсами ET302 и JT610» в Индонезии.

«Боинг» все понял

В корпорации «Боинг» поддержали решение о приостановке полетов авиалайнеров. В сообщении компании отмечается, что «после консультаций с Федеральным авиационным управлением, Национальным управлением по безопасности на транспорте, авиационными властями и потребителями во всем мире Boeing решил следующее: во имя предосторожности и для того, чтобы уверить общественность в безопасности самолетов, рекомендовать ФАУ временно прекратить все операции флота 737 MAX в полном составе». При этом в компании заявили об уверенности в полной безопасности своих машин.
Всего компания «Боинг» поставила заказчикам 385 самолетов серии Boeing 737 MAX, выпускаемой в четырех модификациях, из них 344 — это Boeing 737 MAX 8 — модификация, образец которой разбился в Эфиопии.
В среду поставки самолетов Boeing 737 MAX были заморожены. Однако, по данным агентства Рейтер, производство лайнеров продолжается. При этом, по оценке аналитиков, каждый месяц запрета на использование Boeing 737 MAX может стоить компании от 1,8 до 2,5 миллиардов долларов.

Главное — безопасность

Как заявил в четверг в ходе коллегии Росавиации замминистра транспорта РФ Александр Юрчик, причинами авиакатастроф Boeing 737 MAX 8 являются недостатки разработки и сертификации. Он отметил, что к формированию системы сертификации в РФ «предстоит приложить еще немало усилий». Он обратил внимание участников встречи на то, что «этот элемент повышения безопасности полетов ярко продемонстрирован в ситуации, которая сейчас сложилась в мире с Boeing». «Для нас это должно быть сигналом к выстраиванию очень качественной системы сертификации авиационной техники», — подчеркнул замминистра.
После трагедии в Эфиопии российская авиакомпания S7 приостановила использование имеющихся в ее парке самолетов Boeing 737 MAX.
В прошлом году авиакомпания «Ютэйр» заказала 30 самолетов Boeing 737 MAX 8, но пока ни одного не получила. Как сообщил в четверг журналистам гендиректор «Ютэйр» Андрей Мартиросов, в компании «ждут поставок». «Пока мы никаких уведомлений от Boeing, от лизинговых компаний об отложении поставок не получали. Но, я думаю, что события развиваются стремительно, каждый час новая информация — наверное, какие-то изменения будут», — добавил он и напомнил, что поставка первого самолета для «Ютэйр» ожидалась в апреле этого года.

Расследование продолжается

10 марта самолет Boeing 737 MAX 8 авиакомпании Ethiopian Airlines («Эфиопские авиалинии»), выполнявший рейс из Аддис-Абебы в Найроби, потерпел крушение в 60 км к востоку от столицы Эфиопии. Авиакатастрофа унесла жизни 157 человек из 35 стран, в том числе трех россиян. Причины трагедии выясняются. Спасателям удалось обнаружить оба бортовых самописца.
Оба прибора были доставлены в четверг во французское Бюро по расследованию и анализу безопасности гражданской авиации (BEA). Специалисты Бюро проведут анализ данных цифрового самописца параметров полета и речевого самописца, чтобы установить, почему самолет упал через несколько минут после взлета.
К расследованию причин катастрофы по просьбе властей Эфиопии подключились представители Интерпола.
 
By James E. Hall
Mr. Hall was chairman of the National Transportation Safety Board from 1994 to 2001.

... That it came from the White House instead speaks to a profound crisis of public confidence in the F.A.A.

The roots of this crisis can be found in a major change the agency instituted in its regulatory responsibility in 2005. Rather than naming and supervising its own “designated airworthiness representatives,” the agency decided to allow Boeing and other manufacturers who qualified under the revised procedures to select their own employees to certify the safety of their aircraft. In justifying this change, the agency said at the time that it would save the aviation industry about $25 billion from 2006 to 2015. Therefore, the manufacturer is providing safety oversight of itself. This is a worrying move toward industry self-certification.

Before this policy was instituted, the agency selected these airworthiness representatives, who may have worked for the manufacturer but were chosen and supervised by the agency. These experts were responsible for guiding the agency’s decisions about whether to ground an aircraft for safety concerns.

They take that responsibility very seriously, and grounding an aircraft is an extreme step rarely taken. Most accidents today do not result from systematic aircraft flaws that would justify grounding an entire fleet. I recommended grounding an airliner model only once in my seven years as chairman of the National Transportation Safety Board, following a commuter airliner crash in Indiana.

Since this new “regulatory” scheme took effect, the aviation industry has introduced two new aircraft types, both of which have encountered serious problems. In 2013, Boeing’s 787 Dreamliner was grounded because of fires caused by lithium batteries. In that case, the agency quickly recertified the safety of the aircraft, even before the exact cause of the Dreamliner problems had been determined.

And now, we have the troubled flight management systems of the 737 Max 8, which made its first commercial flight in May 2017. In this case, there have been two catastrophic accidents within five months of each other, involving a relatively new model of aircraft. Boeing itself acknowledges that it is developing a revision to its flight management system.
 
Боинг прекращает поставки и готовит места для хранения

Boeing prepares for MAX 737 jets sitting outside factory as deliveries halted
 
Существует ряд сложных шагов, которые пилоты могли бы предпринять, чтобы дезактивировать систему MCAS, но, как пишет New York Times в анализе, «этих шагов не было в руководстве, и пилоты не были обучены им».
Представитель Boeing, цитируемый Wall Street Journal, сказал, что это было сделано из-за опасений «перегрузить пилотов слишком большим количеством информации».
Boeing Co. скрыл информацию о потенциальных опасностях, связанных с новой функцией управления полетом, которая предположительно сыграла роль в фатальных катастрофах, утверждают эксперты по безопасности, участвующие в расследовании, а также представители FAA среднего звена и пилоты авиакомпаний.

 
NYT приводит последние слова пилота перед катастрофой
The captain of a doomed Ethiopian Airlines jetliner faced an emergency almost immediately after takeoff from Addis Ababa, requesting permission in a panicky voice to return after three minutes as the aircraft accelerated to abnormal speed, a person who reviewed air traffic communications said Thursday.

“Break break, request back to home,” the captain told air traffic controllers as they scrambled to divert two other flights approaching the airport. “Request vector for landing.”

Controllers also observed that the aircraft, a new Boeing 737 Max 8, was oscillating up and down by hundreds of feet — a sign that something was extraordinarily wrong.

All contact between air controllers and the aircraft, Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302 to Nairobi, was lost five minutes after it took off on Sunday, the person said.

 
Тем временем работы по расшифровке идут вяло, в основном подписывают технические документы, уж слишком много желающих поучаствовать в расследовании видимо.
 
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фото нет, только заявление
The evidence, a piece of the Boeing 737 Max 8 jet that crashed in Ethiopia last weekend killing 157 people, suggests that the plane’s stabilizers were tilted upward, according to two people with knowledge of the recovery operations. At that angle, the stabilizers would have forced down the nose of the jet, a similarity with the Lion Air crash in October.
 
Boeing 737 MAX software patch expected before end-March: sources

SINGAPORE/PARIS (Reuters) - Boeing Co (BA.N) plans to release upgraded software for its 737 MAX in a week to 10 days, sources familiar with the matter said.

The U.S. planemaker has been working on a software upgrade for an anti-stall system and pilot displays on its fastest-selling jetliner in the wake of the deadly Lion Air crash in Indonesia in October.

Similarities between the flight path in the Lion Air incident and Sunday’s Ethiopian Airlines crash have raised fresh questions about the system, but so far there is no evidence on whether the same software is again a potential issue.

Asked about the timeline, first reported by AFP, a Boeing spokesman referred to a statement on Monday that the upgrade would be deployed across the 737 MAX fleet in the coming weeks.
 
Я скопирую из обсуждения, туда выложили:

Boeing 737 MAX software patch expected before end-March: sources

SINGAPORE/PARIS (Reuters) - Boeing Co (BA.N) plans to release upgraded software for its 737 MAX in a week to 10 days, sources familiar with the matter said.

The U.S. planemaker has been working on a software upgrade for an anti-stall system and pilot displays on its fastest-selling jetliner in the wake of the deadly Lion Air crash in Indonesia in October.

Similarities between the flight path in the Lion Air incident and Sunday’s Ethiopian Airlines crash have raised fresh questions about the system, but so far there is no evidence on whether the same software is again a potential issue.

Asked about the timeline, first reported by AFP, a Boeing spokesman referred to a statement on Monday that the upgrade would be deployed across the 737 MAX fleet in the coming weeks.
www.reuters.com

Boeing 737 MAX software patch expect
 
How the FAA allows jetmakers to ‘self certify’ that planes meet U.S. safety requirements
By Aaron C. Davis and Marina Lopes March 15 at 9:25 PM

In October 2017, Brazilian regulators flew to Miami to test out the brand-new Boeing 737 Max 8. The team scrutinized the sleek new jetliner’s flight systems and soon published a list of over 60 operational changes, from landing systems to cockpit displays, that Brazilian pilots would need to learn.

Among the new features regulators said pilots would have to familiarize themselves with was the Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System, a safety system that could nose the plane downward if it sensed a potential stall. The regulators mandated an interactive course for pilots to go over the changes and recommended “two legs of SLF,” or supervised flight, according to a copy of their report obtained by The Washington Post.
In those same months, the Federal Aviation Administration was making its final revision to a 53-page report that would make up the backbone of Max 8 training guidelines for pilots across the United States and in almost every other country around the world.

It did not once mention the anti-stall system, according to a copy reviewed by The Post.

In fact, the FAA report suggested pilots would experience nothing surprising in the cockpit of the new Max 8. In a section where FAA test pilots are supposed to list “unique handling or performance characteristics” of new planes, they remarked that there were none: “no specific flight characteristics,” the report read.

Questions about pilot training requirements and the plane’s new technology are at the center of a roiling debate following the crashes of two 737 Max 8s in the past five months. Aviation authorities have said there were similarities between the flight paths of the two planes, each of which crashed shortly after takeoff, and the FAA grounded Max 8s this week. Indications that the crashes may share a common cause have put a spotlight on the FAA’s certification of the 737 Max 8 as airworthy, a process that includes determining whether to require additional pilot training.

“The FAA said nothing about this technology at a critical time — when pilots were learning how to fly the plane,” said Mary Schiavo, a former Transportation Department inspector general. “It makes you ask the question: How much did the FAA actually know about the technology, especially given its history of delegating to industry?”

The FAA’s publication of pilot training requirements for the Max 8 in the fall of 2017 was among the final steps in a multiyear approval process carried out under the agency’s now 10-year-old policy of entrusting Boeing and other aviation manufacturers to certify that their own systems comply with U.S. air safety regulations.

In practice, one Boeing engineer would conduct a test of a particular system on the Max 8, while another Boeing engineer would act as the FAA’s representative, signing on behalf of the U.S. government that the technology complied with federal safety regulations, people familiar with the process said.

Hundreds of Boeing engineers would have played out this scenario thousands of times as the company sought to verify the performance of mechanical systems, hardware installations and massive amounts of computer code, say former FAA officials, engineers and aeronautics experts.

The process was occurring during a period when the Transportation Department’s Office of Inspector General was warning the FAA that its oversight of manufacturers’ work was insufficient.

In the years between the time Boeing launched the Max 8 design in 2011 and the first plane rolled out of production in 2016, the inspector general criticized the FAA’s handling of the “self-certification” system in three successive reports. The federal watchdog said in 2011 that the FAA’s system for deciding which technologies carried the highest safety risks was not effective. Investigators also said the FAA had not adequately trained company employees to spot noncompliance with safety requirements.

In 2015, with the first Max 8 under construction, the IG wrote again that those designated to sign off on safety issues were often doing checks “not related to high-risk issues — e.g., issues that could directly impact the potential loss of critical systems or other safety concerns.”

And the IG specifically singled out the government’s oversight of the Seattle-area FAA office that supervised Boeing’s certifications. “FAA does not know whether it has adequate staffing levels needed to meet workload requirements,” the report read.

In responding to the IG, the FAA agreed with much of the criticism and vowed to keep working to improve oversight of its self-certification programs. But it also defended the outsourcing of certification, writing to the inspector general in 2015 that the “ever expanding magnitude of the U.S. aerospace industry requires that the agency delegate an increasing number of oversight functions” to the companies it regulates.

In a statement to The Post, the FAA acknowledged that its training guidelines for the Boeing 737 Max 8 did not mention the anti-stall program, known as MCAS. But it defended that decision, saying the protocols pilots use to deal with other stabilizer and trim failures would address any MCAS issues.

Boeing and the FAA this week declined to answer questions from The Post about its involvement in reviewing the anti-stall system, including when Boeing first notified the agency that the MCAS system would be on the plane.

“The 737 Max was certified in accordance with the identical FAA requirements and processes that have governed certification of all previous new airplanes and derivatives,” Boeing Communications Director Chaz Bickers said in an email. “Detailed questions should be directed to the FAA.”

The agency said in a statement: “The FAA’s aircraft certification processes are well established and have consistently produced safe aircraft designs. The 737-MAX certification program followed the FAA’s standard certification process.”

In a statement to The Post on Friday, Rep. Peter A. DeFazio (D-Ore.), chairman of the House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, said the precise cause of the Ethiopian Airlines crash that killed 157 people last weekend will likely not be known until investigators are able to analyze information from the plane’s “black boxes.” Still, he said, the FAA can expect a congressional investigation into its certification of the plane.

“I continue to have serious concerns about key decisions made in the FAA’s certification of the 737 Max, and what was, and was not, disclosed to pilots,” DeFazio wrote. “I will be conducting a rigorous investigation to make sure that FAA is carrying out its critical safety mission.”

The current cloud over the FAA’s technical know-how and oversight capabilities can be traced in part to the shifting mission thrust on the nation’s aviation regulators in the aftermath of the terrorists attacks of Sept. 11, 2001.

The hijacking of four airliners that day raised sudden alarms about everything from background checks for tarmac workers to the security of cockpit doors. The agency was spread thin in subsequent years, and airline manufacturers increasingly complained to Congress about delays in certification. The complaints resonated with a Republican-controlled Congress, which in 2003 ordered the FAA to delegate more nuts-and-bolts compliance work to plane manufacturers themselves.

Swamped with what some FAA engineers had already come to see as an unmanageable oversight role, the agency did not forcefully resist. In 2009, it delegated authority to Boeing and the first of what would become more than 80 aviation companies allowed to certify the safety of their own products.

Kurt Krumlauf, one of the FAA officials who shepherded the adoption of the self-certification program, said he saw the approach as an improvement. Until that point, he said, legions of government contractors inspected airplane systems, often without adequate staff, technical training or time to evaluate increasingly complex new technology.

“I had 45 [contract inspectors] reporting to me. I couldn’t honestly spend very much time with any one of them, or on any one issue. I thought this really helped,” he said. “Companies were held accountable, and it increased the number of people inspecting.”

Krumlauf estimated the number of inspectors at Boeing jumped from about 300 contractors reporting to the FAA to 500 in-house Boeing employees.

Others find the arrangement concerning.

Michael J. Dreikorn, a former FAA official and onetime vice president of quality and compliance for jet-engine maker Pratt & Whitney, has been a critic of the FAA’s self-certification process.

“Conceptually, yes, it makes sense because FAA can’t be everywhere,” he said. “But the reality is it is flawed, you have the fox watching the henhouse.”

Four years after self-certification began, fires aboard Boeing’s 787 Dreamliner jets led to the grounding of the fleet and a wave of questions about whether self-certification had affected the FAA’s oversight. A National Transportation Safety Board investigation alleged unsatisfactory oversight of manufacturing processes by both the FAA and Boeing. An IG report estimated that the FAA conducted oversight on only about 4 percent of all parts suppliers on new jets.

Brazilian aviation officials said they did not learn that their position on training for the new plane was unusual until after a Max 8 went down off the coast of Indonesia on Oct. 29, killing all 189 people on board.

Investigators later found that Lion Air Flight 610’s altitude had fluctuated repeatedly in its final minutes, perhaps as pilots fought to overcome the anti-stall software without realizing how to fully disengage it.

On Nov. 7, the FAA issued an emergency notification to pilots of Boeing Max planes, stressing that only two cockpit switches can override the system as pulling back on the yoke would do in other planes. Some U.S. pilots said they were dismayed not to have had the instructions earlier.

But it was a protocol that pilots flying the Max 8 for Brazil’s GOL airline had already been required to click through in a self-guided computer program.

“We saw that there was a difference in the systems and that [pilots] would need to understand the new information in order to be able to pilot using the new system,” said Annelise Pereira, spokeswoman for Brazil’s Civil Aviation Authority.
 
Информация, полученная с бортовых самописцев разбившегося в Эфиопии Boeing 737 MAX 8, свидетельствует о том, что данная катастрофа схожа с крушением такого же лайнера в Индонезии в октябре 2018 года. Об этом заявила в воскресенье министр транспорта Эфиопии Дагмавит Могес.

"Отмечены явные сходства между рейсом 302 Ethiopian Airlines и рейсом 610 Lion Air. Это будет более подробно изучено в ходе расследования", - приводит слова Могес газета The Wall Street Journal. Министр не уточнила, что именно узнали специалисты о произошедшем.

По словам Могес, указанные выводы подтвердили как эфиопские следователи, так и американские. Им удалось получить всю необходимую информацию с самописцев. Доклад на этот счет, как ожидается, опубликуют в течение 30 дней.
 
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Москва. 18 марта. INTERFAX.RU - Министерство транспорта США изучает, на каком основании американское Управление гражданской авиации санкционировало эксплуатацию самолетов Boeing-737 семейства МАХ, сообщила газета The Wall Street Journal со ссылкой на источники в отрасли.

По данным издания, расследование было начато еще после катастрофы самолета этого типа индонезийской авиакомпании Lion Air в октябре 2018 года.


Расследование касается, главным образом, системы Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System (MCAS, "Увеличение характеристик системы маневрирования"). По данным властей, именно проблемы с этой системой могли стать причиной катастроф в Индонезии и Эфиопии. Внедрение такой системы стало необходимым из-за особенностей конструкции нового "Боинга".

737 MAX получил новые двигатели, оказавшиеся чуть большего диаметра и большей мощности, чем на предшественнике 737-800 NG. Их пришлось вынести вперед и немного поднять, что изменило поведение самолета в воздухе, и у него появилась тенденция к "кабрированию" - он стал немного "задирать нос".

Такое поведение самолета в воздухе надо было как-то исправлять, потому что неконтролируемое кабрирование может привести к потере скорости, а это чревато сваливанием, и пилотам требовалось слегка опускать нос лайнера.

Уже после первой катастрофы в сети появились слухи о том, что эта система якобы могла неправильно сработать из-за неисправного датчика, который передавал ей неверную информацию.
 
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