Camera Obscura
Местный
Вот видите, вы только что выступили в роли человеческого фактора, демонстрируя, так сказать, тему топика во плоти. Вы статью не прочитали, сделали выводы, выступили глашатаем. Хорошо что топик не safety critical.Вот тот самый пример. Смотрите алгоритм в статье про Эрбас. Используются данные с двух датчиков угла атаки с построением медианы. Это не мажоритарный элемент, это жалкая попытка его изобразить из того что есть (два датчика)
PS. Пардон, не обратил внимание на просьбу не отвечать сразу.
Цитаты оттуда:
1. The FCPC compared the three ADIRUs’ values of each parameter for consistency. If any of the values differed from the median (middle) value by more than a threshold amount for longer than a set period of time, then the FCPC rejected the relevant part of the associated ADIRU (that is, ADR or IR) for the remainder of the flight.
2. For most of the ADIRU parameters, the FCPC software used the median value when computing the control orders. The use of the median of three values as the system input was a common technique to ensure that significant discrepancies in one value would not influence system performance. Although the use of the median values as the input is generally a robust process, there are still many aspects that need to be considered to ensure that an algorithm works effectively.
3. The FCPC software did not use the median as the AOA value for computing flight control orders (AOAFCPC input) because of the physical location of the AOA sensors. The AOA 1 sensor was located on the left side of the fuselage and the AOA 2 and AOA 3 sensors were located close together on the right side of the fuselage (section 1.6.4). As a result, there was a potential for the AOA 2 and AOA 3 sensors to provide values that were significantly different to the AOA 1 sensor in some situations such as aircraft sideslip.79 If both AOA 2 and AOA 3 varied from the correct value in a consistent manner, then AOA 1 would be rejected even if it was closest to the correct value.
In order to minimise these effects, the FCPCs used the average value of AOA 1 and AOA 2 (AOAaverage) to calculate AOAFCPC input. In addition to the monitoring logic discussed in section 2.1.4, the FCPCs used other mechanisms to prevent discrepancies in either AOA 1 or AOA 2 from influencing AOAFCPC input.
(а ещё рассказывается, как и когда всплыло, что AoA2 и AoA3 могут врать вместе).
4. Each AOA sensor utilised two independent outputs (‘A’ and ‘B’). The relevant ADIRU compared the A and B signals and, if they agreed, processed the data.
Решение было не лучшее, скорее вынужденное. Но и самолёт не самый новый. А вы всё-таки "современную авиацию" обвиняете.