датчик может отказать уже после уборки закрылок.
Может конечно. Но тут речь о другом - что экипажи действовали неверно и без всякого МКАС.
Вася1968 экспертов ищет? Вот из отчета по ЛионЭйр:
Flight Crew Workload
After the IAS DISAGREE had been identified, the Captain instructed the FO to perform memory items of Airspeed Unreliable, and the FO did not perform them. The first four items of the Airspeed Unreliable NNC are memory items to be performed by memory and must be done before reading the checklist. The Captain repeated the command about two minutes after without mentioning the NNC title and the FO was confused of the memory items to be performed. About 1 minute later, the FO asked to the Captain of the memory item to be performed to which the Captain responded “Airspeed Unreliable”. The FO acknowledged and started to locate the checklist. About 1 minute later, the FO found the checklist and started to read the checklist.
The inability for the FO to perform memory items and locate the checklist in the QRH in a timely manner indicated that the FO was not familiar with the NNC. This condition was reappearance of misidentifying NNC which showed on the FO’s training records.
Before the flaps were retracted and MCAS activated, the workload for the flight crew was high but should have been manageable. Workload can be managed by training, knowing procedures, managing or taking control of the known situation and using crew resource management (CRM).[/SPOILER]
Закрылки:
At 23:20:44 UTC, the FO called “Auto Brake Disarm” and advised the Captain of “Indicated Airspeed Disagree”.
At 23:22:24 UTC, the FO suggested to the Captain to continue the flap reconfiguration and the Captain agreed. The flaps started to travel to UP position.
То есть у них была 1:40, чтобы выполнить чеклист по памяти для расхождения скорости - выставить тангаж и тягу, а закрылки не трогать.
Боинг виноват? А у эфиопов кто виноват? Они ничего не слышали про МКАС и как он работает?